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Getting to the Bottom of the
Great Depression
by Kevin E. Pearson
The Great Depression of the th irties tested the foundations of and trust
in the capitalist system . In popular thought, the stock market crash of 1929
is viewed as the cause of the depression . Thou gh the chaos in financial
markets was a contributing cause, other economic factors affected the
length and severity of the Great Depression. One factor noted by Michael
A. Bernstein (1987) , professor of history at the Un iversity of California
in San Diego, was a [!]ajar shift in patterns of consumption during the
twenties and thirties and the subsequent problem of shifting investment
from mature to growing industries. The specific problems of economic
stagnation and high unemployment of the thirties can be traced to this
problem . This article describes how the disruption in financial markets
hindered the flow of capital into the new growth industries of the thirties, thus prolonging the depression. It then analyzes similarities between
the Great Depression and recent economic events.

Changing Consumption Patterns
The twenties were characterized by a rising standard of living, increasing expenditures for new equipment, and a general change in lifestyles .
Bernstein (1987) contends that it was this shift in consumption patterns
at the time of the crash that caused the Great Depression to be so long
and severe. Demand increased for processed food products, tobacco,
household appliances, medical care and insurance, recreation, and education. At the same time, traditional consumer spending fell for goods such
as housing and standard clothing. Those industries meeting new consumer
demands were growing and dynamic; those industries producing traditional consumer goods were declining and mature (Bernstein, 1987, p.
28). These changes in demand changed the kind of output that required
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more investm ent, new technology, and diffe re ntl y train ed labor. Since
it was the growing industries that needed ca pital, previou s investment
patterns w ere less capable of with standing a cycli cal downturn (Bernstein , 1987, p. 36) .

Disruption in Financial Markets
The interruption of the flow of capital after th e stock market crash of
1929 was especially devastating to the growing industries of the thirties .
In financial markets, bankrupt speculators defaulting on their loans caused bank failures . The initial bank failures resulted in widespread panic
to withdraw funds which , in turn , caused additional bank failures.
Galbraith notes that even when banks recovered from the great banking
crisis they were extremely cautious and fearful of resuming normal
amounts of lending (1987, p . 203) . It was the newer dynamic industries
that needed money for investment to supply the capital and train the labor
for new production methods . Unincorporated businesses and small corporations; which made up the growing industries, were affected the most
by the reduction in credit (Bernanke, 1983, p. 265) .
The crash also affected the confidence of businesses. Following the crash
there was a decline in business optimism. Morgan goes as far as to explain the attitude of business as " a functional instability which is . ..
strangely similar to the symptoms of manic-depressive psychosis" (1968,
p. 8) . This decline in optimism made businesses reluctant to invest in new
projects until some degree of recovery took place .
The skewed distribution of income was yet another factor that kept investment levels low. The share of disposable income received by the top
one percent of the population increased from 13% in 1923 to 19% in
1929 (Holt, 1977, pp. 277-80) . Brookes notes that two-thirds of the saving and investing is done by the top five to ten percent of the income
distribution (1984, p. 58) . Thus, the economy was increasingly dependent on expenditures from the upper income group. Galbraith notes that
this group' s inclination to invest was especi ally sensitive to the events
of the stock market (1968, pp . 90-91 ). When the stock market declined
in 1929, so did investment from the upper income group .
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Technological Change and Unemployment
In spite of the disruption in financial markets, technological
developments continued in the thirties. Kondratieff's theory of the cyclical
nature of the economy states that when the economy is in a downturn
there are significant changes in technology. According to Kondratieff, the
type and amount of technological development depends upon the needs
of the people (1984, pp. 66-85). Thus, as the new demands of the " New
Era" were carried on into the thirties, technology developed and grew,
and new production techniques were implemented. For example, Bernstein finds that the growing food, tobacco, and petroleum industries showed steady rates of technological change (1987, p. 122).
Bernstein contends that the increased use of technology in growing industries and the fact that these industries were not yet mature helps explain the persistent unemployment during the Great Depression. First,
technological advances had the adverse effect of causing a lower labor
to capital ratio. As a result, growth in dynamic industries did not cause
equivalent growth in the demand for labor. Second, as people demanded less from established markets and more from new ones, mature industries shrank while dynamic industries found it difficult to attract sufficient capital. Without this investment, growth industries could not
establish the broad-based markets that their full emergence required (Bernstein, 1987, p. 144). Thus, the emerging sectors did not grow fast enough
to compensate for the shrinking mature industries. This helped trap the
economy at a low level of aggregate demand, causing persistent
unemployment.
Consequently, a combination of the three factors of changing consumption patterns, disruption in financial markets, and technological development, combined to magnify the length and severity of the Great
Depression.

The Thirties and Seventies: A Comparison
Comparing the Great Depression to the recent past may help us to
prepare for the future. It must be kept in mind, however, that since the
thirties, changes have occurred and several new controls have been
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established. These inclu de a more equ itable d ist ributi o n of in come, increased labor co ncentratio n in the recessi o n insensitive service secto r,
increased international cooperation, better contro l of t he money sup ply
by the Federal Reserve, SEC regul ati o n of the stoc k market, and FDIC
ins urance on bank accounts (H ell er, 1980, p. 7). These devel o pme nts
help to keep financial markets sound, employment steady, and demand
healthy .
Bernstein compa res the circum stances of th e t hi rties and the seventies
an,d finds t hat in bot h cases t here w as a change in " th e composition of
national output and thereby of employment and capital goods demand.
When short run fi nancial shoc ks at the beginning of each decade
hampered the conversion, the result was a serio us and protracted
economic c risi s" (1987, pp. 215-16). In t he seventies, as in the th irties ,
the economy experienced decreased investment and consumption, high
unemploym ent, and a decline in production . However, the recess ions
of 1970 and 1975 were far less seve re than the Great Depression .
In both the thirties and the seven ti es, po licies designed to help t he
economy were not as effect ive as expected. In trying to so lve problems
of the seve nties, t he government relied on fiscal expan sion . This would
be a correct policy if the U.S . were iso lated, but increased depen dence
on international markets meant that there would have to be regulation
of capital markets for such a policy to work (Bernstein , 1984, p. 219).
In t he thirties, the American government did not res pond effectively to
th e economic crisis. It was thought t hat stimu lating demand with New
Deal pol icies woul d automatical ly ca use reco ve ry . It was not seen th at
recovery wo uld co me about faster fro m increased investment in growi ng
ind ustries.

The Thirties, the Eighties, and the Future
Wh ile the eco nomy experi enced a stoc k market cras h in 1987, t here
are two maj or differences betw een it and th e crash of 1929. First, rapid
price in creases and wild spec ul ation were not as predomin ant in 1987.
Of course, th ere were those peo pl e t hat were " playing the market" in
1987 j ust as in 1929, but most people in 1987 were willin g to hold their
stoc ks for their intrinsic valu e and to w ait until the price of th e stoc k eventu ally rose again . Second , in 1987 th e Federal Rese rve was ready to provi de t he fi nanci al system with additional mo ney, and th ere were pl anned inte rest rate redu ction s in Europe (Sin ai, 1988, p. 17) . Th ese acti o ns

Kevin E. Pearson

Page 11

provided the necessary funds to keep consumption and investment spending healthy so that the U.S. did not experience a marked decline in
econo mic activity. In contrast, the actions of the Federal Reserve in the
thirties ca used interest rates to rise wh ich di sco uraged consumpt io n an d
investment spen ding.
In the eighties, the United States is more a part of a highly interdependent glo bal eco nomy. As a result, the U .S. economy has become more
suscepti ble to external shocks. In the thirti es, the United States was more
economica lly self-suffi cient and did not have to worry as much about the
rest of the wor ld . Now, however, the stability of the United States may
be adversely affected by loan defaults of third world nations. Yet as
Gree nspan ha s noted , the major central banks have contingency plans
to prevent a collapse before defaults would cause a world-wide recessio n and damage confidence in the international economic system (1980,
p. 13). However, if the central ba nks' measures are not enough to control a shock to the world economy, the result would be high unemployment, falling productivity and increased pessimism about the future . It
is important to realize that even though there is more protection and a
la rger world economy than existed in the thirties, potential external problems could cause large adverse shocks (Greenspan, 1980, p. 14).
As part of the global economy, the U.S. fac es heavy competition from
co untries that rebuilt th eir industries after th e Second World War. One
effect of World War II w as that it increased dem and enough to al low the
dynamic sectors of the U.S . economy to complete their growth . This
helped the United States recover from the Great Depression . On the other
hand , one could argue that since the war ended, a demilitari zed Germany and Japan have had more income available for all types of investment, while the U.S. has invested proportionately less in the continual
upkeep and development of capital equipment (Galbraith, 1987, p . 293).
This allowed other countries to become more efficient and take some
business away from the United States, thus compounding the economic
problems the United States faced in the seventies and eighties. In the
future, U.S. competitiveness will depend on greater investment and
development of new technology .
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Conclusion
Demand generated in the " New Era" of th e 1920's meant that large
scale changes in production were needed. In the early stages of transition , the stock market crash of 1929 drained investment funds, wealth,
and confidence. Banks continued to be cautious after they were back
on a sound basis and, consequently, dynamic industries grew too slowly
to spur enough demand or employment to lead to a full recovery. As a
result, the economy remained at a low level. Since then, preventive
measures on a national and worldwide scale have been taken to soften
the effect of a major shock on the economy. Sinai comments that "there
is simply no way that another Great Depression would occur without
egregious miscalculations in Washington, Bonn , and Tokyo" (1982, p.
21 ). With a rapidly changing world economy, however, there is always
the possibility of a large economic shock. If this happens, government
policy will once again try to help the economy recover. One lesson the
government should have learned from the Great Depression is that,
ultimately, a successful economy depends upon adequate investment in
industries that satisfy the prevalent demands of the consumer .
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